Electronically Filed
5/1/2019 2:44 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

)
)

v.
KEEGAN ALLEN STARK,

______________
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 46359-2018
Ada County Case No.
CR0l-2018-8720

)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

BEN P. McGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ...................................... 1
ISSUE .................................................................................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 5
Stark Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred
By Concluding That The Officer Had Reasonable
Suspicion To Believe Bums Was Driving The Car ................................................. 5
A.

Introduction .................................................................................................. 5

B.

Standard OfReview ..................................................................................... 5

C.

The District Court Correctly Held That Mistaken
Identity Did Not Negate Reasonable Suspicion
To Conduct The Stop Of The Car Stark Was
Driving ........................................................................................................ 6

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................ 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) ............................................................................. 6
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) ........................................................................... 7
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) ........................................................... 6
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) .............................................................................. 7
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) ......................................................................... 7
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) ........................................................................... 8
State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 117 P.3d 876 (Ct. App. 2005) .......................................... 8
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2005) ......................................... 6
State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) .......................................... 6
State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 111 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................................ 7
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 263 P.3d 145 (Ct. App. 2011) ................................. 6
State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999) ..................................... 7
State v. Mullins, 164 Idaho 493, 432 P.3d 42 (2018) ......................................................... 5
State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 233 P.3d 52 (2010) .......................................................... 6
State v. Spies, 157 Idaho 269, 335 P.3d 609 (Ct. App. 2014) ............................................ 6
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) ................................................................ 6, 8

11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Keegan Allen

Stark appeals

from

his

convictions

for

possession of

methamphetamine and providing false information to a law enforcement officer. On appeal
he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Stark with possession of methamphetamine, possession of
cocame, possession of manJuana, possession of Alprazolam, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and providing false information to a law enforcement officer. (R., pp. 2729.) Stark moved to suppress "all of the controlled substances and paraphernalia seized as
a result of the illegal seizure and search of the defendant's vehicle and person by law
enforcement." (R., p. 33.)
The district court denied the motion. (Tr., p. 46, L. 19 - p. 61, L. 13.) The district
court found the following facts: On December 7, 2017, an officer attempted to stop a car.
(Tr., p. 51, Ls. 8-14.) The driver of the car sped away, traveled in the wrong lane of travel,
and evaded the officer. (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 14-16.) The officer later located the vehicle parked
at the side of a road, but not the driver. (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 17-19 .) The officer spotted a syringe
in the car, which resulted in a search of the vehicle. (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 19-22.) Also in the car
was a debit card belonging to Justin Bums and a receipt from a convenience store dated
December 6. (Tr., p. 51, L. 22-p. 52, L. 1.) The officer viewed the surveillance recording
from the convenience store relating to the time the receipt was issued and, based on
comparison with photos of Justin Bums, concluded that Justin Bums had been driving the

1

car on December 6 and suspected he was also the driver during the December 7 eluding.
(Tr., p. 52, L. 2 – p. 53, L. 2.)
The officer next saw the car on February 8, 2018, in the same general area he had
seen it the previous December 7. (Tr., p. 53, Ls. 8-14.) This time he got a look at the
driver, and believed it was Burns, but was unable to make contact because Burns parked
the car and fled on foot. (Tr., p. 53, L. 15 – p. 54, L. 8.)
On February 20, 2018, the officer again saw the car in the same general area. (Tr.,
p. 54, Ls. 9-18.) The officer followed the car which, although it did not attempt to elude
him, took an indirect route with “an extraneous turn or two.” (Tr., p. 54, L. 19 – p. 55, L.
3; p. 60, Ls. 3-8.) The officer stopped the car with the intent to arrest Burns. (Tr., p. 55,
L. 9 – p. 56, L. 4.) However, the driver this time was Stark. (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 4-9.)
The district court concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest Burns on
a parole warrant, and for possession of drugs and eluding arising from the December 7
incident. (Tr., p. 55, L. 18 – p. 56, L. 2.) When he stopped the car on February 20, 2018,
the officer had reasonable suspicion that Burns was the driver of the car based upon
evidence that Burns had driven the car on December 6, 2017, December 7, 2017, and
February 8, 2018. (Tr., p. 56, L. 3 – p. 60, L. 23.) By the time the officer learned that
Burns was not the driver of the car, he had already developed suspicion of criminal activity
by Stark because a syringe had dropped out of the car when Stark exited. (Tr., p. 60, L. 24
– p. 61, L. 11.)
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Stark conditionally pled guilty
to possession of methamphetamine and providing false information to a law enforcement
officer pursuant to a plea agreement which included the state dismissing the other charges.
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(R., pp. 96-97, 115-17.) The district court entered judgment and Stark filed a timely appeal.
(R., pp. 121-28.)

3

M
Stark states the issue 0n appeal as:

Did the

district court err

When

it

denied Mr. Stark’s motion t0

suppress, because the ofﬁcers did not have a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that he in particular had been engaged in criminal activity?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Stark failed t0 show that the district court erred by concluding
had reasonable suspicion to believe Burns was driving the car?

that the ofﬁcer

ARGUMENT
Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Erred BV Concluding That The
Ofﬁcer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Believe Burns Was Driving The Car

Stark

A.

Introduction

The

district court

concluded that the stop was reasonable because the ofﬁcer had

reasonable suspicion that Burns,

who was wanted on

possession and eluding, was driving the

car.

a warrant and 0n suspicion 0f drug

(T12, p. 51, L. 8

—

p. 61, L. 13.)

Stark does

not claim the district court erroneously found probable cause 0r reasonable suspicion t0
stop Burns.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-17.)

suspicion that “he in particular”

10.)

“By focusing on Mr. Burns,

He

was engaged

argues instead that ofﬁcers did not have

rather than the person actually

stopped—Mr. Stark—the

characterization of the issue and resulting determination were fatally

district court’s

ﬂawed.” (Appellant’s

brief, p. 12.)

Because Stark has

failed to address,

the district court’s determination that the ofﬁcer’s suspicion that

driving the car

B.

(Appellant’s brief, p.

in criminal activity.

was

Standard

reasonable, he has failed t0

show

it

much

less refute,

was Burns Who was

error.

Of Review

“When a decision 0n a motion t0

suppress

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact that are supported

by

is

challenged, the Court accepts the

trial

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the

application of constitutional principles t0 the facts as found.” State V. Mullins, 164 Idaho

493, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (internal citations omitted).

The

C.

District

Court Correctly Held That Mistaken Identity Did Not Negate

Reasonable Suspicion To Conduct The Stop

An

investigative detention

believe that criminal activity

is

may be

Of The Car

Stark

Was

Driving

justiﬁed if an ofﬁcer has “reasonable suspicion to

534 U.S. 266, 273

afoot.” United States V. Arvizu,

“An investigatory

(2002) (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted).

with hard certainties, but with probabilities.”

State V.

stop does not deal

Munoz, 149 Idaho

P.3d 52, 57 (2010). “The reasonable suspicion standard requires

less than

121, 126, 233

probable cause,

but more than mere speculation or instinct 0n the part of the ofﬁcer.” State

V. Spies,

157

Idaho 269, 272, 335 P.3d 609, 612 (Ct. App. 2014).

“The quantity and quality 0f

information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion

is

establish probable cause.”

149-50

App. 201

(Ct.

1).

less than that necessary t0

State V. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 684-85,

263 P.3d 145,

“[R]easonable suspicion can arise from information that

reliable than that required t0

show probable

cause.”

is less

Alabama V. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330

(1990).

The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
Dakota, 136
for

S. Ct.

reasonable persons.”

ﬂ

reasonableness.

Birchﬁeld

V.

North

2160, 2186 (2016). The reasonable suspicion standard “allows

some mistakes 0n

2010).

is

room

the part of police ofﬁcers, so long as the mistakes are those 0f

State V. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302,

246 P.3d 673, 675

also State V. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424,

429

(Ct.

(Ct.

App.

App. 2005)

(“The application 0f probable cause t0 arrest must allow room for some mistakes by the
arresting ofﬁcer; however, the mistakes

leading

sensibly t0

their

must be those of reasonable men, acting 0n

conclusion 0f probability”)

‘reasonableness' requirement 0f the Fourth

many

factual determinations that

(CL

[I]n

order to

facts

satisfy

the

Amendment, What is generally demanded of the

must regularly be made by agents of the government

is

not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.’” State

V.

Kimball,

141 Idaho 489, 492, 111 P.3d 625, 628 (Ct. App. 2005) (brackets and ellipse original)
(quoting Illinois V. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)). Thus, an ofﬁcer’s actions based

0n mistaken

identity are not unlawful if the mistake is reasonable. Hill V. California, 401

U.S. 797, 802 (1971) (“When the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and

when

they reasonably mistake a second party for the ﬁrst party, then the arrest ofthe second party

is

a valid arrest” (parentheses and internal quotations omitted)); State V. McCarthy, 133

Idaho 119, 125, 982 P.2d 954, 960 (Ct. App. 1999) (“a search incident t0 an arrest
lawful even though the arrest

was made of

the

wrong person Where

reasonable in their mistaken belief as to the identity of the arrestee”).

may be

the police

E

were

alﬂ Baker

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (“The Constitution does not guarantee

V.

that only the

guilty will be arrested”).

The
car,

concluded that the ofﬁcer’s suspicion that Burns was driving the

district court

based upon evidence that Burns had been driving the car

three

months

in the

same general

area,

at least three

was reasonable. (TL,

Application of the correct legal standards shows that the

p. 56, L. 3

district court

concluding the ofﬁcer’s suspicion that Burns was driving the
incorrect,

was reasonable. The

did not render the

initial

district court

p. 60, L. 23.)

did not err

by

although ultimately

did not err by concluding the mistaken identity

was n0 reasonable suspicion that he had committed

was unlawful. (Appellant’s

the district court erred

car,

—

trafﬁc stop constitutionally unreasonable.

Stark argues that because there

a crime the stop

times in the past

brief, pp. 12-16.)

by “focusing on Mr. Burns,

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

The

stop

Speciﬁcally, he claims that

rather than the person actually stopped.”

was unlawﬁll, according t0

Stark,

because “the ofﬁcers

did not have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Mr. Stark—the particular

person actually stopped—of criminal activity.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.

14.

E

211$

Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (“In the instant case, the person for Which the police had reasonable
suspicion

was not

the particular person stopped.”).)

argument—that a mistaken

Stark’s

n0 basis

in law.

As shown

However, the underlying premise of
unreasonable—has

identity necessarily renders a stop

above, a reasonable mistake of identity does not render an

otherwise valid stop unreasonable.
In context, Stark

The

closest he

someone

else,

comes

makes no argument

t0 a relevant

that the

argument

is

mistaken identity was unreasonable.

the assertion that

“it

was

plausible that

not Mr. Burns, was driving.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) The case he cites

in support, State V. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 117

P.3d 876

(Ct.

App. 2005), does not address

mistaken identity (the defendant was the person the ofﬁcers intended t0 stop) and stands
for the proposition that evidence the registered

owner 0f the car has a suspended

does not rise t0 the level ofreasonable suspicion justifying a general stop ofthe

argument does not address the central holding of the
identity

was reasonable and thus did not negate

Even

error.

than Burns was driving, such does not render

Arv_izu,

534 U.S.

at

argument

Even if it was
it

car. Stark’s

court—that the mistaken

the validity of the investigative stop.

treating the single line in the brief as an

was unreasonable, Stark has shown no

district

license

that the

mistaken identity

“plausible” that

someone other

unreasonable to suspect Burns was driving.

277 (reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility 0f innocent

conduct”); Illinois V. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (investigative detention not

unreasonable even where the information available t0 the ofﬁcer
susceptible of an innocent explanation”).

is

“ambiguous and

Moreover, the evidence available to the ofﬁcer was sufﬁcient t0 reasonably suspect
that

Burns was driving the

As

car.

stated

Burns had been driving the same car

by the

in the

district court, the

same area on

months, including two prior attempts to stop the

was reasonable

for the ofﬁcer t0 investigate

car.

ofﬁcer had evidence that

three occasions in the prior three

(TL, p. 46, L. 19 — p. 61, L. 13.)

Whether Burns was driving the car 0n

occasion by stopping the car and contacting the driver. Stark has failed to address,
less

show

error, in the district court’s

to stop the car,

was ultimately

and

It

this

much

conclusion that the ofﬁcer had reasonable suspicion

that the otherwise valid stop

was not rendered unreasonable by what

a mistaken identity.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to afﬁrm the judgment ofthe district court.

DATED this

1st

day 0f May, 2019.

/s/
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